Elvio Ceci, PhD*
The Constantinian University, New York

ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZED CRIME: CAMORRA

Abstract: Organized crime is a topic that deserves special attention, not just in criminal science. In this paper, the author analyzes Italian crime organizations in their origins, features and relationships between them. These organizations have similar patterns that we will show, but the main one is the division between government and governance. After the introductory part, the author gives a review of the genesis of the crime, but also of the main functions of criminal organizations: control of the territory, monopoly of violence, propensity for mediation and offensive capability. The author also described other organizations that act on the Italian soil (Cosa Nostra, ’Ndrangheta, Napolitan Camora i Apulian Sacra Coroina Unita). The central focus of the paper is on the Napolitan mafia, Camorra, and its most famous representative – Cutolo. In this part of the paper, the author describes this organization from the following aspects: origin of Camorra, Cutulo and the New Organized Camorra, The decline of the New Organized Camorra and Cutolo: the figure of leader.

Key words: mafia, governance, government, Camorra, smuggling.

INTRODUCTION

Referring to the “culturalist trend” in contemporary criminology, for which the “criminal issue” must include what people think about crime, certain analysts studying this trend, such as Benigno says, “it cannot be possible face independently to cultural processes which define it”.

Concerning the birth of criminal organizations, a key break occured in 1876 when the left party won the election and the power of the State went to a new leadership. During that period emerged two kinds of interpretations about the birth of “Mafia”. On one side, some theories came from L’inchiesta sulla Sicilia (Investigation on Sicily) by Franchetti and Sonnino, suggesting that the explication of crime is made by focusing on the traditional state of economic backwardness in the south of Italy. On the other side, regarding organized crime born at the end of 50s, while the forces of national unification were clotting, it is possible to see already as the police...
are compromised with organized crime. The aim of organized crime is to infiltrate, to instigate, and to implode the Italian national institutions.

As Benigno says, it is difficult that mafia phenomena respond to those typologies. Mafia is pervasive in the society; it is inside the society, and we can live near mafia without understanding it. There are, however three significant errors in this line of thinking.

The first error, a logical and epistemological error, is thinking of the habits of complex organizations as the habits of more advanced organizations. According with the theory of complexity, it is the opposite: the habits of simpler organizations are more evolved. During their historic dynamics, indeed, they had the opportunity to solidify a notable number of conservative structures making their processes instinctive, automatic and simplified. Criminal organizations and mafia, just because they are extremely evolved, are simple and tend to simplify constantly. Over time, they tend to reduce the complexity of their structure.

The second error is analyzing the mafia phenomenon only as an Italian phenomenon. If we focused only in Cosa Nostra, the strongest mafia organization and originally from Sicily, we can see how it is not the only one in Italy or in foreign countries. Every mafia in the world is distinct from one another; but each one retains characterizing features of similarity, which permit us to recognize criminal organizations from gangs and gangs from individual criminals. These features are so characterizing and identifying of their place of origin to be an exception in the nation in the world: in the world, there are few nations in the world in which there are indigenous criminal organizations. Without a comparative analysis of various criminal organizations, we cannot stress their differences or, even worse, their common patterns. Indeed, the contrast between mafias is not possible without both accentuating their differences as well as identifying their common and regular patterns, without which we cannot establish the structural elements of the mafia phenomenon.

The third error consists in the relation between organized crime and power, not between political power and mafia order, but of the mafia's power in itself as a fundamental entity of this organizational structure. According to Bertrand Russell, large swaths of social studies are wrong about a crucial point: since power is to social sciences as energy is to physics, it is not possible to understand social sciences without the fundamental concept of power; likewise, it is not possible to understand physical sciences without the fundamental concept of energy. The mafia's power is not delimited only to the monopoly of violence. There is not a simple, civil, and pure society invaded by the strong and corrupted impetuosity of criminal organization. There is not only the weak pitted against the strong. There is not only violence in the power of mafia's supremacy. The power of mafia is a classifiable, historically identified, evident and definable, total power. In the nature of this power there is main feature of every criminal organization: a typology of power that causes criminal organizations everywhere. This total power defines the transaction from gang to mafia, from gang to criminal organization, according to a precise and recurrent process. Without defining that power, without following Russell's epistemological paradigm, we cannot talk authoritatively about criminal organizations and crime.
1. GENESIS OF CRIME

To know how and why a person kills, how and why a criminal organization is born, we must address and solve the so-called etiological problem, the cause of a crime, the cause of criminal activity itself.

In their study of crime, Ceci and Montereale, differentiate between the criminology of the individual and the criminology of the subject. The former concerns individual criminal cases, even serial ones, specifically crimes characterized by individual and non-collective actions and which require examination from anthropological, psychological and psychiatric sectors. On the other hand, the criminology of the subject is characterized by collective actions carried out by organized subjects, such as gangs, sects, mafias, and terrorists, whose decoding essentially requires sociological, juridical and political analysis.

Obviously, the criminology of the individual can never be considered in a detached way from the criminology of the subject. A criminal is always at the same time a person and a social role; a family murderer is always also a father, and a terrorist is always a killer, too. But neither one of these is always and only this. The individual and the subjective dimensions interact continuously, one influencing the other. It is clear, however, that a terrorist behaves essentially in harmony with the social and organizational role he represents, while a father who awakens and kills the whole family in the morning is primarily acting from personal psychic distress.

In scientific terms, therefore, if we use Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction as a method, we can differentiate without distinguishing the individual dimension of the criminal act from its subjective dimension /Derrida, 2014/ with deconstruction as a method, we can differentiate in each criminal act the quantity and quality of individual and subjective factors and at the same time analyse their connections and interplay /Andronico, 2002/.

In any case, regarding either the individual or the subject, we must pose the problem of the genesis of crime, which is the so-called etiological problem.

We can affirm, indeed, that crime always derives from a state of liminality, which can be called emptiness: both because the liminality is not always characterized by a scission but almost always only by a rituality of transition; and also because, when such a liminality is characterized by a scission, the affected individual experiences a cognitive split between the conscious and the unconscious. In the subject, it becomes a political scission between government and governance.

In this way, that is, in the mode of the symbiotic split between conscious and unconscious and/or between government and governance, as well as in the sense of the transformation of the empty liminality:

- crime in the individual dimension is born from a cognitive emptiness;
- crime in the subjective dimension is born from a political vacuum.

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We will now begin to analyse criminal organizations, and on this point we will focus our discussion.

Because criminal organizations have been established only in some nations and not in all, not even in the majority of the world’s nations—and often, in the case of particular nations, only in some regions exclusively, such as how Italy experiences organized crime in 4 regions out of 20—it is necessary to analyze these nations and regions after having first understood the structure of the single organization. We have studied the habitat conditions that have determined the subjective connotation of the various criminal organizations. And it has been noted that a criminal organization is always born and structured only when a political vacuum has been determined in a defined territory.

A political vacuum is defined as when a scission between government and governance has been determined: government without governance remains in the hands of national political institutions, but governance without government remains in the hands of criminal organizations. Criminal organizations are born and structured only if they are able to carry out collective local actions; if there is a territorial governance to be carried out; and always and only when that governance is neither carried out nor developed by public political institutions. All those who commit a crime, both individuals and/or subjects, are in a state of liminality; it is worth noting, of course, that not all who are in a liminal state will commit a crime. Moreover, it is precisely the state of liminality that generates this power; but since not all those who are in a state of liminality commit crimes, we must limit ourselves to a consideration only of those who have the power to be able to carry out criminal action. This power arises when there is a certain relational gain.

To get a clearer picture, I will describe briefly the structure of Italian criminal mafia organizations while trying to always keep in mind three principle caveats about them:

1. The mafia is more than the fixed historical subject that has been known as to date. It has become more fragmented, in the sense that it is not possible to pinpoint a prevailing archetype. Instead, we can point to different and differentiated multiform or typeless types, which are changing; at any moment, the mafia could already be different, and yet the same decentralized structure would still remain, hierarchically, in circumscribed territorial areas, whose size varies according to various moments throughout history (if anything, mafia structure should be analyzed according to to the methods of repression of public power, to see where the political vacuum is maintained).

2. As we have said, the mafia is a simple organization, built entirely around the conjugation of the money-violence binomial. Max Weber’s bureaucracies help us to understand the relational simplicity and the levels of consistency of the mafia’s formal and informal structure. One of the most in-
teresting areas of research is related to the mimetic capacity of the mafia action in its own referential context.

3. Finally, the behaviour of the mafia constitutes an extreme version of our daily behaviour. This also will be seen explicitly through the most important relational and social tool of all: language.

Within this model of crime, the violent and definitive act occurs often because the mechanism of organization cannot work efficiently or, more precisely, because the effectiveness of action hides the root inefficiency of the organization. The experience of Falcone is emblematic: he persisted on evaluating according to the human component and its fallacy. The efficacy (and not the efficiency) is the main feature of crime, which has a constant demand of adaptability to a given context.

Every criminal system endeavours to develop its function of habitat perverseness through the efficacy of its activity, which is indispensable to guaranteeing social adjustment in a way that efficiency does not guarantee.

Although the main social changes, illegal organizations (either mafia or not) changed constantly in relation to society. First of all, the mafia was parasitic among criminal organizations, which were often a stop for the growth. In any case, criminal organizations were ready to change, deeply, as times changed, too.

However, the mafia conserved some specific features. It has conservative functions that are strong and individual, essential to living system adjustment.

2. FUNCTIONS OF CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS

The first conservative function is the control of the territory, made in an opposite and complementary way from the State: where the State cannot come, mafia arrives; what the State cannot guarantee, mafia can. Without limits and bounds, mafia are more trusted than the State. The modalities of mafia in the physical domain derives from their interests first in agriculture, then in trade activities; and later in buildings, public tenders, and industrial activities; and finally, in public finance, from disposal of all waste, to the national lottery and European public fundings. In this sense, we can partially refute the idea that mafia determines conditions of economic underdevelopment or even poverty.

Sicilian mafia first developed when plantations of citrus fruits prompted an important economic growth in the surrounding area of Palermo. Later, it was exactly the mafia’s presence that imposed an important limit to the growth of productive activities in other Sicilian areas such as Nisseno, Agrigento’s, Trapani’s areas, and parts near Catania.

Criminal organizations induce a structural impoverishment within the habitat in which they act, with a low rate of radicalization and their attention focused solely on economic interests in an international context. Conversely, mafia protects its territory through a second conservative structure: a monopoly of violence. Certainly, exercise of this structure is illegal, and it was actued in collaboration with, and in competition with, public institutions.
The main point of that para-political organization is its relation with the State. For years, in Italy, this relationship resembled a genetic bond that feeds their power mutually. The third conservative structure is dedicated to the propensity for mediation between internal groups inside the public administration that is corrupted often or convinced to avoid conflicts. They try to find a compromise with the official authorities to a solution before the conflict to solve the problem.

When the agreement does not work, these organisms solve their problems with a very high level of violence, both internally and externally. Their offensive capability becomes the fourth conservative structure, which is very important to survive in extremized competitive environments.

To withstand the continuous process of adaptation, mafia developed an internal hierarchical structure, strengthened by codified rules. The codification of behaviour patterns and of rule is important to identify and to distinguish mafia from common (international) criminal organizations, which find their balance on a mixture of economic interests and power. Mafia can give away economic interests to affirm its power, and it can give away its power to defend its interests. But the criminal organizations cannot do these things because (unlike Mafia) they do not differentiate power and interests into two independent components. Organized criminals are delegitimized if they give away economic interests, for some reason. Criminal groups try to add stakeholders, while mafia want to preserve the continuity of initiation rituals with the aim to recognize and turn someone into their criminal institution. This control of unwritten laws defines the constitution of structure tied to power relationships between cosche that, in spite of numerous internal conflicts, refuse to dissolve one another. Individuals are killed, but not the subjects: people can be eliminated, but not their roles. But in the world of organized crime, internal conflicts and individual violations change frequently-unwritten rules, and so they render their own structures obsolete: the death of one individual changes or cancels the representative subject. Indeed, the elimination of a person corresponds to the elimination of that role.

Mafia was a simple pyramidal structure that, remaining well-established in its territory, governed vast international markets in several parts of the world. Many affiliates were supporters and partners that were chosen to become uomini d’onore (literally, “man of honor”). One became uomini d’onore by way of a real process of adoption: partners or common criminals were selected after an observational period; they were employed and tested in specific mafia acts. Once the test was over, often unconsciously, came an internship period called affiliazione, new participants were inserted in the family, as in a real power structure. The new participants did not know the identity of the other members of the family: these new uomini d’onore were inserted inside a hierarchical structure of Cosa Nostra and were called at the right moment. Like all bureaucratic and formal organizations, mafia had its initiation rituals, which were very important to demarcate the bond between the inner circle and the outside. The oath (setting a holy card on fire or blood spilling) was made by sacral gestures that derived from primitive forms of religion and superstition. Not everyone could become uomini d’onore. It was necessary for one to have a clean background and to have no irregular conjugal situations or relatives within the state police or magistrature. One could lose the status of uomo d’onore only upon
death. The protection of the organization was conferred to *uomini d’onore* from affiliates, supporters, and partners. Following a very rigid system of rules, they were responsible for distributing prizes and punishments, for defending and making secure the chain of silence (*omertà*) that protected the secret of their membership.

But only the boss of the family had the role of defending the family and creating relationships with other families. Every family was the basic unit of the organization, and it had hegemony over its territory corresponding to a village or a metropolitan area, relative to the family’s degree of importance. In the beginning, the family was composed of blood relatives and similar. In fact, the parental bond was reduced. In every case, however, the family was governed by a boss who was elected by members or by heritage. From the time of Corleonesi, the role of *capofamiglia* (head of the household) was imposed from the top of the organization, usually from the Regional Committee that defended his authority. The *capofamiglia*’s control over the territory and over the behaviours of his initiates was unconditioned. No one could kill another person without his authorisation, unless if these murders were strategically relevant and were planned by the Regional Committee. The family would rule its territory with a widespread net of micro-criminality, which was very useful for combing economic resources and information.

To govern this complex criminal world in one territory, the *capofamiglia* would nominate his vice, one or more counsellors and *capodecina*. The *capodecina* is a member of the family who can coordinate a maximum of ten *uomini d’onore*, who are related to the family and who represent the terminal element for the market. These *uomini d’onore* were a special force on the border between mafia’s organization and the territory’s more strictly criminal universe.

A determined number of families connected with each other, for territorial contiguity or for alliances, constituted a *mandamento*. The boss of the *mandamento* (*capomandamento*) was chosen by all the bosses of the families. From the time of Corleonesi, bosses of *mandamento* were imposed by the top of the organizations and exactly from their direct hierarchically superior organ: the province. During that period, the unit with the real power of control of mafia’s structure was the Provincial Committee; of which Palermo’s one was the strongest, and it dominated the others. Palermo remains the heart of the System.

Still today, the power in mafia organizations is given by the triangle province-*mandamento*-family, in which control of territory is fundamental. No mafia boss, even if wanted, would leave his place of origin, because he was the boss of para-political organization in which the research of power and riches is fundamental.

External mafia activities were essentially investments without physical or financial limits. The transnational dimension of mafia was realized without threatening territorial grounding. The organizational power model is similar to Roman legions that controlled the peripheral locations preserving Rome’s integrity and supremacy. The correspondence between Roman military structure and mafia’s *mandamento* expands mafia which is now a transnational network with a hidden central heart. The contemporary mafia is just one among the several types of criminal organizations: the Colombian cartels, the Chinese triads, the Japanese Jakuza, the Mexican and African mafias, etc....
It is not the aim of this paper to show the differences and distinctions between several typologies; but we can touch upon the Italian mafias. We have four defined and precise categories:

1. **Cosa Nostra**, which we have already described at length, was the genetic nucleus of the Italian criminal organizations.

2. **Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta** had a horizontal and community-based structure; it ruled a divided territory with absolute power. The Calabrian mafia’s family (‘ndrine) were more autonomous from the Regional or Prinicipal Committees. The center of their power resided in the tremendous influence of ‘ndrina from Reggio Calabria over all the others.

3. **Neapolitan Camorra** is a molecular mafia, comprised of hundreds of bands that create and recreate without order or discipline. Camorra has a tendency to structure itself according to a confederate model with temporary alliances with predominant groups, related according to interests. As we will see, a wide number of social classes participate in the Camorra mafia. Camorra is a mercantile mafia.

4. **Apulian Sacra Corona Unita** is the youngest Italian criminal organization, and it became autonomous at the beginning of the eighties. It has a pyramidal structure, like ‘Ndrangheta, but its expansion has been similar to Camorra, involving children and women.

In these years, mafia became more than a criminal organization. It lost its para-political dimension, transforming in a para-economic organization. Today, mafia is a service for the State: an activity legitimized by markets—almost legal, invisible and indefinable. The influx of money made through illegal activities, however, does not allow for a definitive legalization.

However, they become legal when able to build security agencies, lobbying agencies, financial agencies, and markets. The payment offers guarantee and advantage. Mafia now covers a new economic space, and it wants to not show its presence: this is the reason for the decrease in killing. When mafia was a para-political organization, it needed visibility and perceptible; but since it became a para-economic service, it is imperceptible but pervasive. It follows money through every part of the system, in illegal and legal ways. Whoever pays is not a victim, but rather a client. This change insulates mafia from judicial investigations and state inquisitions.

The new mafia destabilizes the present order by enabling a generalized uncertainty; it wants to rebuild its sense of order to assure security to society and, therefore, there is a permanent threat for mafia necessarily to construct a permanently-controlled society.

### 3. SIMILARITIES

Man has always sought security, however he could, however he could find it, and in several shapes: in an exclusive relationship with a partner, in the family, or in the community; in having other men or things; in religions or in chemical halluci-
nogens; in words; in hatred, and in love. Men build their security out of themselves, out of the social and political relation systems and out of the State, the Leviathan. They look for a paradoxical transfer: to cure the endemic inner fear of the soul with the security of external institutions in society and by means of the power of administration.

According to Bauman /2005/ we fear three kinds of pain: physical, environmental, and social. Protection from these three threats requires the institution of an order that substitutes the surge of desires, thereby reducing the freedom. But it is for this reason precisely that the order is threatened. Freud considered this as to be new form of social bartering.

This kind of security can generate new levels of freedom for individuals who become citizens. It can happen only if security and freedom can be integrated according to a principle of justice and not according to some simple criterion of necessity and utility.

Security is the perception of sustainability around an organization and a subject in an organization, towards new risks that threaten its existential condition. Conversely, insecurity is empty space, a break in a system’s network, disconnect of social strata. Freedom, though, manifests in tandem with a sustainability enacted by citizens in their interactive space, in their habitat.

In any case, a sense of security is derived from the external actions of a human being—out of his soul—not from therapy but from social conditioning, a political function. The daily uncontrolled behaviours, not an initial criminal act, are the causes of our endemic insecurity.

4. CAMORRA

During the post-war period in Naples, there was neither state nor work. The only work was through contraband. Goods from the U.S. were stolen and resold. Authorities avoided ruling the market, leaving the poor population to work in this way. The demand for contraband justified the regulatory intervention of Camorra.

While contraband disappeared in all parts of Italy after the Second World War, in Naples it remained tied to the cigarette market. Lucky Luciano was in Naples during that period, and he understood the city’s strategic position for the contraband market: because low-cost unskilled workers, and because of authorities’ tolerance. More than one thousand people worked in this kind of job. Fruits and vegetables were smuggled as well, and their prices were selected by a camorrist, Presidente dei Prezzi, from which he took a fee. If something was not right, homicide could be a solution. Moreover, he distributed money and forced people to repair weddings. He took fees for both for lawful and for illicit activities.

The centralization of Neapolitan contraband was planned eagerly by Cosa Nostra, spearheaded by Lucky Luciano, who quickly understood the division between government and governance. In that post-war period, Palermo found itself under

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investigation by the magistrature, and Lucky Luciano began to realize that if cigarettes and fruits could make for good trade, so could weapons and drugs.

4.1. Origin of Camorra

“Camorra can be defined as organized extortion: it is a popular secret society, whose aim is evil”. In this way Marco Monnier, an acute historian and scrupulous observer, defined Camorra in 1863. Several years later, Paolo Villari defined Camorra as a “social plague” in his Lettere Meridionali: this was the first work to describe the conditions of Southern Italy in a critical way.

The opinions of Monnier and Villari are important to help us focus this hyper-trophy of criminality that had infected one city and regions once deemed felix in ancient times that, today, are infelix. As we have already mentioned, the private use of violence as an instrument of social control is the main feature of the Camorra. The Camorra, on one side, does not respect the law or government, but on the other hand these same systems of government strengthens Camorran control through their secret relationships with government officials. This brand of arrangement also occurred during the Bourbon reign: Liborio Romano, prefect of the Bourbon police, inserted a large number of Camorra’s members to ensure public order. But they use uniform to accomplish even more crimes and to improve contraband.

The principal aim of Camorra is to be an intermediary or moderator of power; it manipulates and mobilizes resources for the purposes of power and personal gain. Camorra can not be understood as an external body of the society, but it is a important feature for social control in the Neapolitan and Casertana areas /Nobile, 2006/.

“The Neapolitan society [...] is assembled by two contrasted societies. It is clear if we analyze statistics on the area in which leaps out at our a paradox: the crime grows either when employment grows, and per capita income grows, and with the growth of consumption, and if the usage of daily journa, television, cinemas and theaters, as says cultural usages, increases.

It is an illusory paradox which depends on if we see Neapolitan territory populated [...] by a homogeneous population.

There are, instead, two different populations: a clear modern minority that increases the use of cultural goods, which lives in a modern bussness; and a population, the absolute majority, that slides always into the inculturation, in the familial tribalism. There are two populations that live in the same part of the city, in the same building but also with two different languages, two different interpretations of life, work, society, customs, and moral behaviours.”

As we will see, this social reality is important for understanding how the boss of Camorra recruits young men and financial resources: a southern reality makes the background of Neapolitan reality. In alleyes of this city, there is no correspondence between the demographic and economic growth, and a large part of underclass that improve this kind of criminal mediation in the population.

7 Author’s translation.
Before Cutolo, it was not easy to be initiated into the Camorra gang. One needed a long-time apprenticeship, would have to undergo a cruel selection process, and would need to pass numerous tests. There were several punishments for those who broke the *Frieno*, according to a codex made by twenty-six rulers who regulated the *onorata società* (honourable society). We can see one cause of the dissociation between government and governance that makes Camorra seem acceptable to the local population. To ensure payment of taxes, public officials would use violence against the population. This abuse of power happened so many times that the Neapolitan citizenry did not perceive the power of the State as the common benefit or good, *super partes*, which regulates the daily social life. The public utility of taxes was not perceived, since there was not correspondence between payed tax and public services. The city was lacking in everything, and public works were made only to improve life of nobles and prelates. Camorra had strong influence among the Neapolitan population, and they used a similar system of official power. They occupied the empty spaces left by the government, up to be tolerated by legitimate power. Ultimately, Camorra became the new social mediator through violence.

Beginning in urban context, Camorra has been legitimized slowly but progressively. Working primarily in jails and markets, Camorra's members have altered their look during the years, adopting professionalism not unlike that of a manager or an investor. Their relationship to political power is a business relationship: Camorra offers services that the State can not achieve, for example, the disposal of waste.

As we will see in next chapter, the wish of dirty and lethal gold was born with the *Nuova Camorra Organizzata* (New Organized Camorra) and the *Nuova Famiglia* (New Family). During this bloody period, the ties between Camorra, terrorists, the secret service, P2, and the government became stronger.

Several arrests and police interventions, the result of collaboration with ex-members of Camorra (*pentiti*), marked the end of the most influential Camorra families and the explosion of local waves of delinquency and violence: this system is more unpredictable and more violent than ever; and criminals employ and have access to far more dangerous weapons than before (now they use bazookas, uzis, Kalashnikov, and time bombs) imported from unstable zones (Balkans, ex-Yugoslavia, Albania). In recent years, unlike in the eighties, there are no big Camorra bands or families; but there are unstable clusters, every one of which is autonomous. Today, the most important group is the Alliance of Secondigliano. Their conflict is always a war for power.

4.2. Cutolo and the New Organized Camorra

Raffaele Cutolo was the boss of New Organized Camorra (*Nuova Camorra Organizzata*, NCO), whose aim was to transform Camorra from a criminal organization with metropolitan ganger style into to a unique, hierchical and vertical organization with a strong and ideological matrix as well as an uncontested obedience to their boss. On one hand, he sought ideology similar to that of a political party; on the other hand, Cutolo wanted to create an organization similar to Cosa Nostra or ‘Ndrangheta.
Cutolo attempted to create his organization during the seventies and eighties. He adhered to a specific criminal doctrine resembling a cult of personality and in which he endeavoured to join the rituals and structure of old Camorra (in esoteric way) with the new drug trade (cocaine). The new figure of the investor-criminal grew in prestige, and at times Cutolo was legitimized both by local and by national political classes (for example, when he was called to negotiate with *Brigate Rosse* for the release of Ciro Cirillo, the councillor of public work in Campania). Cutolo took advantage of the enormous poverty and the poor prospects of the lower social classes, offering to the people the opportunity of social legitimacy and redemption through a quick and simple enrichment. He found mainly proselytes in jail, from where Cutolo directed his organization. The organization was officially born on the 24th of October 1970 (the day of S. Raffaele, his name-day), and it ran strong for thirteen years, until the deaths of high-ranking members Casanova and Casillo in June of 1983. But NCO came in criminal scene in 1978 when Cutolo was escaped to the judicial mental hospital in Aversa and when he started to ask for thirty thousand lire in return for every trunk of contraband cigarettes in all Neapolitan coasts.

At the beginning of seventies, Naples was the main base of Italian and international contraband, the strategic centre of criminal traffic. In 1960, Marocco regained independence, and it tried to emancipate by founding the monarchy. The new state reorganization closed the free city of Tangeri and criminal organizations across the world lost their main center for traffic in the Mediterranean Sea and in Europe. In that port there were no monopolies or customs duties. Traffic was redirected to the East, to Yugoslavian or Albanian ports passing through Apulia. But these were only final destinations: Naples was the main waystation for contraband cigarettes. Contraband brings richness, and Naples became precious for the other criminal organizations such as Cosa Nostra and the Franco-Maghrebis “Marseilles”.

At the beginning of the sixties, the Neapolitans played secondary roles; they were gregarious of Sicilians and Marseilles: they bought the goods, rented ships, and coordinated the operations... Ten years later, the Neapolitans had become leaders of traffic due to two factors: an intensification of war between Cosa Nostra and Marseilles, and the Italian judiciary’s decision to close in the jail Sicilian boss in Naples. Indeed, in 1971 the Sicilians and Marseilles started to fight each other over control of Naples’ port; and at the same time, mafia bosses like Stefano Bontate, Gaetano Riina and Salvatore Bagarella moved to Naples, creating new alliances and collaborations with local crime. As Lucky Luciano had anticipated, Cosa Nostra started to collaborate with friendly organizations, giving one mafia’s structure to urban criminal. In that period, Camorra was a branch of Cosa Nostra, and included such trustworthy men as Zaza, Mazzarella and Nuvoletta. Their affiliation with smugglers and Neapolitan criminals (from Naples and Caserta) helped them to win the war against Marseilles. Many people in Camorra sided with Marseilles, because they had more advanced technology and a faster naval arsenal than Cosa Nostra; but they were defeated by the Sicilians’ victory in Neapolitan traffic. During that year, Salvatore Zaza became the boss of the Neapolitan Cosa Nostra, and Lorenzo

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Nuvoletta was his vice. In 1974, the Sicilian bosses met with the Neapolitan bosses to sign pacts and rules for the traffic. At Nuvoletta’s farm there were present Pippo Calò, Totò Riina, and Bernardo Brusca.

There were four paranza, that is, Mafia-Camorra smuggling associations: Michele Zaza’s clan, affiliated with Palermitan Alfredo Bono; the clan affiliated with the Palermitan Spadaro brothers; the clan of Nunzio La Mattina, Enrico Sciorio and Luigi Maisto; and the clan of Nuvoletta from Marano, Bardellino from Aversa and Enrico Maisto, connected with the Palermitan Salvatore Savoca. These collaborative agreements remained in effect until 1979, when they were cut off as a result of both criminal organizations turning more to drug trafficking.

At this point, the Camorra started to invest in the Neapolitan area using mafia money (money laundering), buying and exploiting lands, farms, and building companies. More importantly, their behaviours changed: cocky behaviours gave way to more violent and bloody behaviours. The international drug traffic definitively transformed Camorra. In the seventies, drugs became the organization’s main business. Smuggling networks and the drug trade unified after 1978, allowing Camorra to pass regional limits, creating a new mafia identity and organizing it in a more total way. Their main drug was cocaine imported from Latin America. This change of dimension generated a division between Neapolitan society and Camorra: while contraband was more or less permitted both for the lower and middle classes, because the contraband trade stimulated the need for jobs, drugs cause death by overdose in the society, which makes to grow cultural associations against that problem. The rise of the drug trade signaled the first break between society and criminal subculture. But even in this case, the Italian state could not fill the empty space between government and governance of that problem, allowing Camorra to sell drugs still now in a specific square (piazza di spaccio).

That was also evident due to political uncertainty in the region. After World War II, Naples was governed by Achille Lauro, an ex-fascist turned monarchic supporter. Following 1962, Lauro became a Democrazia Cristiana’s (DC) politician belonging to Dorotei’s group. His leader was Sergio Gava, a senator and thirteen-time minister, with his son Antonio Gava, president of Campania’s region between 1960 and 1969 and later depute and minister. The relationships between Gava’s family and Camorra clans were central to their power in local sectors. They moved money in four areas in public investment (from tourism to industries and productive activities), in building speculation, in new bank constitutions, and in public financing for their “friends”. This increased the electoral base, generating a sturdy economic-political group.

When the power of Gava’s family decreased in the seventies, they formed relationships with other political goups, such as Ciriaco De Mità’s one. The same system remained in place when Naples elected new mayor, the communist Maurizion Valenti, who needed votes from DC and Almirante’s MSI to approve specific projects.

12 P.A. Allum /1975/: Potere e Società a Napoli nel Dopoguerra, Giulio Einaudi Editori, Torino.
Camorra in the seventies was constituted by a set of horizontal clans without an organized unitary structure or hierarchy. The New Organized Camorra, as engineered by Cutolo, emerged out of that background.

4.3. The decline of NCO

Raffaele Cutolo’s father was a direct farmer oppressed by his landowner Astoria. Trying to defend himself, he asked the Camorra boss Alfredo Maisto to help him. This shocked his son Raffaele who, once he grew up, became affiliated with Camorra. After committing his first murder, Cutolo went to jail and, since he was one of few literate men, he helped other prisoners write letters to their families and friends. Members of ‘Ndrangheta and Camorra began looking to him to create a new organized crime subject.

In 1977, Cutolo was transferred to the judicial mental hospital of Aversa, bringing the NCO outside its local territory. After that, he put himself in contact with the mayor of Ottaviano, Salvatore La Marca, and tried to negotiate public financings from the state and CEE. Frictions with Cosa Nostra began when Cutolo imposed a fee of thirty thousand lire for every smuggled cigarette case. So in 1978, some families created a new cartel against Cutolo called Nuova Famiglia (New Family): these families included Nuvoletta’s, Zaza’s, Giuliano’s and Bardellino’s. They aimed to control the area with the most important traffic of drugs in the world, that being Naples, and to be the delegates for Cosa Nostra. In that war, which spanned from 1978 to 1982, more than five hundred people were killed.

The Irpinia earthquake of 1981 was one of the main sources of public financings that enriched NCO. On the 27th of April 1981 the Brigate Rosse kidnapped Ciro Cirillo, councillor for public works of Democrazia Cristiana. Since directors of Democrazia Cristiana were afraid Cirillo admitted publically to the relationship between DC and Camorra, they asked Cutolo to help free him. He accepted for some privileges (for example, companies affiliated with Cutolo had to win public financing to rebuild the land after the earthquake). In the end, Cutolo managed to arrange for Cirillo’s release, giving BR a billion lire on 24th July 1981. But this case had national exposure, and the President of Italian Republic, Sandro Pertini, could not accept this. Pertini requested that Cutolo be transferred to the maximum security prison in Asinara. Cutolo was then cut off from all outside communication; he lost all contacts with his organization. All his trustworthy men were killed or rued. In June 1983, the police incarcerated four hundred member of NCO: Cutolo had lost the war.

4.4. Cutolo: figure of leader

Cutolo was seen in different ways ranging from authoritarian statesman to Messiah: he was a cultured man and boss, the guardian of the Neapolitan soul and an absolute genius. His figure as boss was central for the NCO economy and structure, and he utilized hugely ideological propaganda. His chosen affiliates were hopeless and unsuited men; and they became the hard core of his organization.
The name of his organization was very appropriate: Nuova (“new”), marked a shift from the previous, more rural Camorra; Camorra, signalling a connection to traditional Honorable Society; and Organizzata (“organized”), which promised a unitary structure and precise rules. NCO’s differences were:

- territorial extension and control (Naples and province, Region of Campania, Northern Italy and Apulia);
- mafia for the masses (enrollment on great scale and without degree of kinship);
- centralized leadership;
- the ideological component.

For these reasons, Cutulo took advantage of a kind of language and mental inference which is called endophasic, with different and distant emotions joined together with the aim to collect as many people as possible: “man costs very little when afflicted by need and ignorance and he has not the instruments to understand what it is hidden in a gesture, in a evaluated friendship”. For the first time in Camorra’s history, Cutolo tried to oppose “foreigners” (not from Campania or Naples) who wanted to occupy the Neapolitan capital (Cosa Nostra). He tried to establish a regional criminal identity and so he was considered the Savior of Naples who would be able to restore the city to its former riches. NCO was the bearer of social values protecting the poor and the weak; it supported the redistribution of riches and social justice.

All this was conducted only on a rhetorical level, but nevertheless Cutolo was able to seize the emotions and expectations of young people until they felt themselves to be “initiates”. The NCO improved some “social activities,” for example with the killing of a little girl’s assassin, plus a payment of six million lire to the family; or when the NCO chose to find European financings did not request fees and duties to farmer. About himself, Cutolo said: “I’m the successor who suffers in jail, I assign justice, I’m the real judge who takes from the usorer and gives to the poor. I’m the real law, no what comes out in the courts”.

Camorra was always described as a positive association. Contrary to ‘Ndrangheta or Cosa Nostra, which tried to remain anonymous, NCO issued flyers and granted interviews to daily journals and TV. Cutolo wrote a book explaining the NCO’s philosophy. After that, a lot of young men felt the need to justify and claim their own actions, and so they began to imitate the boss himself.

All of that bring to create identification processes by analogy with the leader.

Cutolo organized the NCO in a scientific way: individuals belonging to the lower hierarchies would be associated with lower-profile criminal activities; the more wealthy and profitable individuals were responsible for controlling the area generally. To maintain his organization, Cutolo designed a statute, structure, oath, ceremonial,

and ritual that conferred on the NCO a sense of importance that swayed simple and impressionable men; they would identify with the NCO and they would be willing to lose their life for it. The point of reference for NCO was the ancient Camorra, full of rituals and whose name was Bella Società Riformata (“Beautiful Reformed Society”). Cutolo also tried to revive the ancient structure and organization: at the top was “Gospel” (Raffaele Cutolo), the leader; next there were “saints”, the boss’s most trustworthy men (Pasquale Batta, Vincenzo Casillo); next, there were sgarristi, bosses of a smaller area; then, at bottom there were labourers. Young affiliates were called cumparielli and Cutolo’s personally-hired assassins were called batteria di fuoco.

Rituals were fundamental. The initiation ritual for new affiliates was similar to ‘Ndrangheta’s: it was called “baptism, legalization, fidelity”. Several variations of this ritual exist, one of them being the Giuramento di Palillo (“Palillo’s oath”).

1. First, one baptizes the place with the incantation, “Buon vespro, buon vepro. Siete conformi? Su che cosa? Per battezzare il locale.” (“Good vespers, good vespers. Are you in compliance? About what? To baptize this place”). This phase recalls religious traditions.

2. Next, the ritual passes to invoke the code of silence (omertà): “Omertà bella, come m’insegnasti, pieno di rose e di fiori mi copristi, a circolo formato mi portasti dove vi erano tre veri pugnalisti” (“Beautifull omertà, as you taught me, you covered me with roses and flowers, and you brought me in a society where there were three with knives).

3. The ritual continues with a historical reference to three members of Camorra who were expelled from Spain in 1771 then went to Sardinia, Sicily and Calabria to found the Beautiful Reformed Society.

4. The new member of Camorra will then pledge allegiance to the godfather, who cuts the new member on his forearm; both men then unite their bloody wrists, swearing loyalty to Camorra with a blood oath.

5. They hug each other.

6. Finally, they make a shape-cross cut on their right thumb and swear on Camorra one last time.

New affiliates ranged from twenty-five to thirty years old. All affiliates were inserted in the culture of urgency: since they perceived the shortness of their life and not alternative future, they tried to enjoy their present lives as best as they possibly could.

Cutolo chose consciously situation of deculturation inside lower-class population. The hard core became from the jail, which was useful for the recruitment of new members; and especially in juvenile jail, as future workers. Cutolo gave those new members advocates and money to survive in the jail, in addition to many other privileges.

16 N. Esposito /2015/: op. cit., p. 33.
18 N. Esposito /2015/: op. cit., p. 34.
19 See: F. Barbagallo /2010/: op. cit.
CONCLUSIONS

In the last years, the mafia became a criminal organization as well as something more. It totally lost its dimension of para-political organization, transforming instead into a para-economic one; today, it has become a service legitimized by the market, invisible and indefinable, even almost legal. In this paper we have presented some structural similarities across the Italian mafias: Cosa Nostra, ‘Ndrangheta and Camorra. The latter was our focus in the final part of this study.

When mafia was a para-political organization merely, it had to be perceptible, even if not visible or identifiable. But with the new mafia, the new sense of organized crime is comprised of self-referential poles of one identical transnational network. It builds its power on a generalized mass insecurity. It is auto-poetic, which is to say that it destabilizes the established order, in effect rebuilding its own order. The endless threat of insecurity is useful for its determination to rebuild a permanently-controlled security.

Only if the state will return to effecting a stronger and more pervasive policy of governance; only if the state will make aggressive efforts to be present in its functions and if society will accept the need and convenience for living within the boundaries of the law; only then will society return to the control of a central and public organism.

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Dr Elvio Ceci
Konstantinijev Univerzitet, Njujork

ANALIZA ORGANIZOVANOG KRIMINALITETA: KAMORA

APSTRAKT


Ključne reči: Mafija, upravljanje, vlada, Kamora, krijumčarenje.